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((Running head)) 
Ribeaud and Eisner: A Unified Scale of Moral Neutralization  
 
((Abstract)) 
Can the three concepts of Neutralization Techniques, Moral Disengagement, and Secondary 
Self-Serving Cognitive Distortions be conceived theoretically and empirically as capturing the 
same cognitive processes and thus be measured with one single scale of Moral 
Neutralization? First, we show how the different approaches overlap conceptually. Second, in 
Study 1, we verify that four scales derived from the three conceptions of Moral Neutralization 
are correlated in such a way that they can be conceived as measuring the same phenomenon. 
Third, building on the results of Study 1, we derive a unified scale of Moral Neutralization 
which specifically focuses on the neutralization of aggression and test it in a large general 
population sample of preadolescents (Study 2). Confirmatory factor analyses suggest a good 
internal consistency and acceptable cross-gender factorial invariance. Correlation analyses 
with related behavioral and cognitive constructs corroborate the scale’s criterion and 
convergent validity. In the final section we present a possible integration of Moral 
Neutralization in a broader framework of crime causation. 
((Keywords)) 
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In the past decade the concept of moral disengagement has received increased attention, 
notably in the field of child and youth development (Hyde, Shaw, and Moilanen 2010; 
Hymel, Rocke-Henderson, and Bonanno 2005; Paciello et al. 2008). In particular, moral 
disengagement has been examined as a possible predictor of aggression and delinquency and 
turns out to be consistently associated with both (Bandura, Barbaranelli, and Caprara 1996; 
Pelton et al. 2004). Alongside moral disengagement, which was developed relatively recently 
within the framework of social learning theory (Bandura, 1986; Bandura et al., 1996), other 
similar concepts were introduced independently in related fields of research. Both the 
criminological theory of neutralization techniques, formulated back in 1957 by Sykes and 
Matza, and the notion of self-serving cognitive distortions introduced by Gibbs and 
colleagues (e.g. Barriga and Gibbs, 1996; Gibbs, Potter, and Goldstein, 1995) appear to 
describe cognitive processes that are comparable to moral disengagement. These processes 
assist to self-justify acts that are in conflict with a person’s moral beliefs and self-concept and 
are thus key mechanisms for understanding aggressive and more generally deviant behavior 
of subjects that view themselves as generally rule-abiding and complying with common moral 
standards. 
Demonstrating conceptual and empirical convergence among concepts developed in related 
fields of research serves to eliminate unnecessary duplication and reduce complexity by 
unifying concepts and terminology. The present research has four interrelated aims in that 
direction: First, to investigate whether moral disengagement, neutralization techniques, and 
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self-serving cognitive distortions conceptually and empirically capture the same cognitive 
processes. Should this be the case, the second aim is to develop a unified measure suited for 
preadolescents and youth that builds on all three concepts and specifically focuses on the 
neutralization of aggression and violence, and to examine this measure’s scale reliability and 
validity. The third aim is to explore to what extent the new unified concept—labeled moral 
neutralization—can be integrated into a broader framework of crime and violence causation 
that specifically conceives violence as moral action, i.e., Situational Action Theory 
(Wikström and Treiber 2009).  
We begin by describing and comparing the three theoretical concepts and examining to what 
extent they converge conceptually. Then we review four selected scales derived from moral 
disengagement, neutralization techniques, and self-serving cognitive distortions and test 
whether they intersect empirically in such a way that they can be regarded as essentially 
measuring the same. For that purpose we use data from a sample of preadolescents surveyed 
to pilot and refine a moral neutralization questionnaire in German (Study 1). Next, on the 
basis of these data, we construct a composite scale derived from the four scales. Finally, in 
Study 2, we examine the reliability and validity of the scale developed in Study 1 using a 
large sample of 11-year olds within the prospective longitudinal study z-proso (Eisner, Malti, 
and Ribeaud forthcoming; Eisner and Ribeaud 2005). Validity tests include correlations with 
well-established behavioral and cognitive outcomes in the domain of aggression and 
antisocial behavior and also with constructs related to core propositions of Situational Action 
Theory (Wikström and Treiber 2009). 
1. Conceptual Convergence of Neutralization Techniques, Moral Disengagement, and 
Secondary Self-Serving Biases? 
In essence, the three concepts of neutralization techniques, moral disengagement, and self-
serving cognitive distortions, which are, in the following, generically grouped under the term 
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moral neutralization, address the same key theoretical question: Through which cognitive 
processes can an individual who is generally rule-abiding and compliant with moral standards 
minimize cognitive dissonance, threats to self-concept, and experiences of moral self-sanction 
when he or she transgresses those standards? 
The first authors who tried to answer this question were two American sociologists, Sykes 
and Matza (1957). Their theoretical effort was driven by their disagreement with Cohen’s 
subculture theory (1955), which understands delinquency as a working-class youth reaction to 
perceived deprivation. Sykes and Matza’s starting point was the simple observation that many 
delinquents have a middle-class background and moral beliefs as well as basic normative 
orientations no different to those of non-delinquents. This led them to seek the cognitive 
processes necessary to overcome the incongruence between internalized norms and beliefs 
and delinquent behavior. Such processes are viewed as preceding a particular delinquent act 
(Sykes and Matza 1957, 666) and are therefore conceived as being proximally involved in the 
causation of crime and violence. These processes correspond to the five techniques of 
neutralization (Table 1): 
Denial of responsibility denotes a technique by which “the delinquent can define himself as 
lacking responsibility for his deviant actions” (667), i.e., externalizes the locus of control. For 
example, a violent interaction might be framed as an accident, as provoked by the victim, or 
as the product of peer pressure.  
Through denial of injury perpetrators rationalize the consequences of their acts as not really 
harmful to the victim. For example, the psychological consequences of verbal bullying might 
be discounted. 
Denial of the victim occurs when “the delinquent accepts the responsibility for his deviant 
actions and is willing to admit that his actions involve injury” (668). Here, the role of the 
victim is redefined, for example conceiving the victim as a wrongdoer who deserved a lesson. 
5 
Condemnation of the condemners involves shifting attention from the delinquent act to the 
motives and behavior of those who disapprove such acts (668), for example, portraying 
authorities as hypocritical or corrupt. 
Finally, Sykes and Matza describe the appeal to higher loyalties as follows. “Fifth and last, 
internal and external social controls may be neutralized by sacrificing the demands of the 
larger society for the demands of the smaller social groups to which the delinquent belongs 
such as the sibling pair, the gang, or the friendship clique” (669). 
More than three decades after the first formulation of a moral neutralization framework by 
Sykes and Matza “no less a figure than Albert Bandura . . . developed an important cognitive 
theory of ‘moral disengagement’”(Maruna and Copes 2005, 6).  
Table 1: Overview of concepts of moral neutralization 
Cognitive Mechanism 
 Moral Disengagement 
 (Bandura et al. 1996) 
 Neutralization Techniques 
 (Sykes and Matza 1957) 
 Secondary Self-Serving  
 Cognitive Distortions 
 (Barriga and Gibbs 1996) 
Cognitive restructuration 
 - Moral justification 
 - Euphemistic language 
 - Advantageous comparison 
 - Appeal to higher loyalties 
 - Euphemistic language 
 (implied) 
 - Minimizing/mislabeling 
 (partially) 
Minimizing own agency 
 - Displacement of 
 responsibility  
 - Diffusion of responsibility 
 - Denial of responsibility  - Blaming others (partially) 
Disregarding/distorting 
negative impact 
 - Disregarding consequences 
 - Distorting consequences 
 - Denial of injury  - Minimizing/mislabeling 
Blaming/dehumanizing  
the victim 
 - Dehumanization 
 - Attribution of blame 
 - Denial of the victim 
 - Minimizing/mislabeling 
 (partially) 
 - Blaming others (partially) 
 - Assuming the worst 
 (partially) 
Condemnation of 
condemner 
 
 - Condemnation of 
 condemner 
 
Assuming the worst      - Assuming the worst 
 
Like Sykes and Matza, Bandura starts from the observation that “people do not ordinarily 
engage in reprehensible conduct until they have justified to themselves the rightness of their 
actions” (Bandura et al. 1996, 365), stressing that mechanisms of moral disengagement 
precede immoral acts, and are thus involved in their immediate causation. 
Comparison of the mechanisms of moral disengagement (Bandura et al. 1996) with Sykes and 
Matza’s categories shows a high degree of overlap (Table 1). The first set of disengagement 
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practices labeled cognitive restructuring aims to reframe reprehensible conduct as socially 
acceptable behavior. Bandura and colleagues (1996, 365) differentiate three mechanisms of 
restructuration: By “moral justification detrimental conduct is made personally and socially 
acceptable by portraying it in the service of valued social or moral purposes” (365). This 
definition obviously encompasses the appeal to higher loyalties described by Sykes and 
Matza. The second mechanism, euphemistic language, is viewed as a “tool masking 
reprehensible activities or even conferring a respectable status upon them” (365). Although 
Sykes and Matza fail to mention this mechanism explicitly, euphemization is implicit in their 
theory. The many terms placed in quotes in their original paper suggest that neutralization is 
implemented through euphemization.1 The third mechanism of cognitive restructuration 
consists in “exploiting advantageous comparisons with more reprehensible activities” (365) 
to neutralize injurious conduct or make it to appear of little consequence.2 
The second set of disengagement practices encompasses techniques that aim to displace or 
diffuse responsibility for reprehensible acts. In perfect congruence with Sykes and Matza’s 
notion of denial of responsibility this implies externalizing the locus of control for socially 
sanctioned behavior. Typically, people will “view their actions as springing from social 
pressures or dictates of others” (365) or group decision-making will be used as a means to 
cognitively diffuse personal responsibility. A third set of disengagement techniques is aimed 
at disregarding or distorting the consequences of antisocial behavior. Note the striking 
congruence with Sykes and Matza’s notion of denial of injury. 
The last set of disengagement practices relates to a biased perception of the victim. Bandura 
and colleagues (1996) mention two types of victim-related mechanisms of disengagement. 
Dehumanization of the victim “divests people of human qualities or attributes bestial qualities 
to them. Once dehumanized, they are no longer viewed as persons with feelings, hopes, and 
                                                 
1 E.g., “…deviant acts are ‘accidents’ … Vandalism … may be defined … as ‘mischief’ …” (Sykes and Matza 
1957, 667). 
2 Producing conceptual overlap with the mechanism of distorting consequences. 
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concerns” (366), while “by attribution of blame, people view themselves as faultless victims 
driven to injurious conduct by forcible provocation [by the victim]” (366).3 Obviously, these 
two mechanisms largely coincide with the neutralization technique of denial of the victim. 
Overall, moral disengagement and neutralization techniques appear to be broadly congruent. 
The main differences are the more elaborate concept of moral justification compared to the 
narrower concept of the appeal to higher loyalties, the lack of a counterpart to advantageous 
comparisons in neutralization theory, and condemnation of the condemners in the moral 
disengagement framework.  
The third framework of moral neutralization is rooted in the concept of cognitive distortions 
or thinking errors (Ellis 1962; Beck 1963) and was developed in the context of young 
offender rehabilitation by Gibbs and colleagues (Barriga and Gibbs 1996; Barriga et al. 2000; 
Gibbs et al. 1995). In contrast to Ellis’ and Beck’s focus on self-debasing distortions, Gibbs 
and colleagues are interested in self-serving distortions. They distinguish between primary 
and secondary distortions: “Primary cognitive distortions are self-centered attitudes, thoughts, 
and beliefs” (Barriga and Gibbs 1996, 334) and involve “according status to one’s views, 
expectations, needs, rights, immediate feelings and desires to such a degree that the legitimate 
views, etc. of others (or even one’s own long-term best interest) are scarcely considered or are 
disregarded altogether” (334).4 Secondary distortions serve to support the primary distortions 
and “have been characterized as pre- or post-transgression rationalizations that serve to 
‘neutralize’ conscience or guilt” (334). Like neutralization techniques and moral 
                                                 
3 This mechanism consists in externalizing the locus of control by locating it in the victim. Accordingly, it 
represents a special case of displacement of responsibility. Note also that Bandura conceives the construct of 
hostile attribution of intent (Crick and Dodge 1994) as a possible mechanism of attribution of blame (366). The 
problem of conceiving hostile attribution as a mechanism of moral disengagment is discussed in the last section 
of the present paper. 
4 Criminologists will notice the striking similarity between the definition of primary cognitive distortions and 
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s concept of self-control (1990, 89), and particularly with the two constituting 
dimensions of self-centeredness and impulsivity (i.e., a “here and now” orientation and the inability to defer 
gratification). 
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disengagement, Gibbs and colleagues conceive cognitive distortions as preceding antisocial 
action (although not always). As shown below, their account of secondary cognitive 
distortions (Table 1) shows strong similarities with the other two moral neutralization 
frameworks. 
Blaming others comprises “misattributing blame to outside sources, especially: another 
person, a group, or a momentary aberration (…); or misattributing blame for one’s 
victimization or other misfortune to innocent others” (Barriga and Gibbs 1996, 334). This 
distortion overlaps with disengagement mechanisms such as diffusion and displacement of 
responsibility and attribution of blame. 
The second type of distortion, minimizing/mislabeling, consists in “depicting antisocial 
behavior as causing no real harm, or as being acceptable or even admirable; or referring to 
others with a belittling or dehumanizing label” (334). Obviously, this concept shares much in 
common with Bandura’s notions of moral justification, euphemistic language, advantageous 
comparisons, disregarding or distorting consequences, and dehumanization.  
Finally, the notion of assuming the worst, which consists in “gratuitously attributing hostile 
intentions to others, considering a worst-case scenario for a social situation as if it were 
inevitable; or assuming that improvement is impossible in one’s own or others’ behavior” 
(334) partly overlaps with Bandura’s concept of attribution of blame, but also extends the set 
of possible neutralization mechanisms.5 
Overall, our review shows a high degree of congruence among the processes of moral 
neutralization described by the three frameworks of moral disengagement, neutralization 
techniques, and self-serving cognitive distortions, thus justifying further enquiry into the 
empirical overlap between measures derived from them (for a further discussion of theoretical 
approaches in the field of moral neutralization, see Maruna and Copes 2005). 
                                                 
5 The closeness of this notion to hostile attribution of intent (Crick and Dodge 1994) is not unproblematic in our 
view, since it tends to conflate moral rationalisation with biased information processing. 
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2. Measurement Instruments for Neutralization Techniques, Moral Disengagement, and 
Self-Serving Cognitive Distortions 
All three moral neutralization frameworks have been empirically tested. Some instruments 
were designed to measure post-hoc neutralization of offences committed by research subjects 
(e.g., Rogers and Buffalo 1974) while others assess endorsement of neutralizations for 
selected scenarios of antisocial behavior (e.g., Ball 1966). Most instruments in this field, 
however, consist of conventional item batteries designed to capture different mechanisms of 
moral neutralization using Likert scales. Such instruments have the advantage that they are 
not limited to post-hoc justifications and thus allow offenders to be compared with non-
offenders and measurements to be used to predict later offending. Given appropriate wording, 
these instruments are easier to understand than a scenario-based approach (e.g., Shields and 
Whitehall 1994) which is an important issue in studies with children. 
The preselection of scales for the z-proso study was guided by three requirements. First, the 
scales of interest had to be related to one of the three moral neutralization frameworks 
presented above. Second, they should measure neutralization of aggressive behavior. Third, 
they needed to be suited for a preadolescent sample, and later a youth sample. Four scales 
were selected using these criteria: techniques of neutralization of violence were measured 
with a brief instrument used for all age groups in the Denver Youth Study (i.e., from age 7 to 
at least age 20) (Huizinga et al. 2003). In the following, this scale is referred to as NT1. Moral 
disengagement was assessed with two scales: Scale MD1 is the original 32-item scale 
designed by Bandura and colleagues (1996, 374) and first used in a general population sample 
of 10- to 15-year-old Italian adolescent (M=11.8) of which an abbreviated version was used 
by Pelton and colleagues (2004) in an African-American community sample aged between 9 
and 14 years (M=11.4). Both versions suggest a one-dimensional factor structure of moral 
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disengagement, i.e., the mechanisms of moral disengagement tend to come together in the 
same persons (Bandura et al. 1996, 367; Pelton et al. 2004, 36), and accordingly both yield 
high internal consistency (Cronbach’s α=.82). The second moral disengagement measure 
(MD2) specifically examines moral disengagement related to school bullying (Hymel, Rocke-
Henderson, and Bonanno 2005) and was tested in a Canadian upper and middle class sample 
of 8th-, 9th-, and 10th-graders. Out of 51 items, 13 were identified as indicators of the four 
main mechanisms of moral disengagement (Table 1, column 1, rows 1–4). Factor analysis 
showed a single factor of moral disengagement, again suggesting that the different 
mechanisms of moral disengagement tend to converge. The resulting scale yielded a 
Cronbach’s α of .81. Self-serving cognitive distortions were measured with an adapted 
version of the “How I think” questionnaire (HIT). Unlike the original questionnaire by Gibbs 
and colleagues (2001), which also encompasses non-violent problem behavior, the adapted 
Dutch version (van der Velden 2008) specifically focuses on aggression and bullying among 
children and adolescents of both genders (M=11.4 years). Whereas van der Velden (2008) 
does not report pertinent analyses, two studies (one American by Barriga and Gibbs 1996, 
339; the other Dutch by Nas, Brugman, and Koops 2008, 186) that use the original HIT scale 
in mixed samples of incarcerated and general population male youth (16<M<17 years) report 
strong correlations among the three secondary self-serving cognitive distortions (between .71 
and .78), again suggesting a one-dimensional latent construct of moral neutralization. 
Generally, measures of moral neutralization correlate with aggressive and delinquent 
behavior. For example, a study using a neutralization techniques scale similar to the one used 
in the Denver study reports correlations of r=.40** and r=.41**6 between neutralization 
techniques and violence in the American National Youth Survey (Agnew 1994, 580). Bandura 
                                                 
6 ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; n.s.p>.05; n.a.not available 
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and colleagues (1996, 369) report correlations between .13***7 and .56*** between moral 
disengagement and aggression, and .20* and .45*** for delinquency. Pelton and colleagues 
(2004, 36) report similar patterns in their sample while Hymel and colleagues (2005, 38) 
report a highly significant association between bullying and moral disengagement 
(F(2, 459)=69.57***). Regarding secondary self-serving cognitive distortions, Barriga and 
Gibbs (1996, 339) report correlations between .23** and .38*** with the Nye Short Self-
Report Delinquency Questionnaire and between .43*** and .55*** with the Externalizing 
Scale of the Youth Self-Report. Similarly, Nas and colleagues (2008, 186) report coefficients 
between .20* and .29** for correlations among self-serving cognitive distortions and the 
Teacher Report Form and of .20n.a. and .37n.a. between self-serving cognitive distortions and 
the Reactive-Proactive Aggression Questionnaire.  
 
3. Study 1: Empirical Overlap and Composite Measure 
Study 1 set out to explore the empirical overlap of the different measures of moral 
neutralization of aggression and violence and, if possible, to derive a composite measure 
based on the best-fitting items of the different scales. 
3.1. Participants and Data Collection 
The 142 participants were recruited in seven 4th- and 5th-grade classes in middle-class 
suburbs near the city of Zurich. Parental consent was obtained for all participants in advance. 
All contacted parents and children consented to participate. The mean age of the participants 
was M=10.5 years (SD=0.68), 52.5 percent were male. The surveys were conducted during 
                                                 
7 The correlation of r=.06*** reported for teacher-rated aggression in Table 1 is erroneous and should read 
.13*** (personal communication from Claudio Barbarenelli, 2 July 2010). 
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regular school hours. Participants were guided through the written questionnaire by two 
researchers. All questionnaires were completed within 45 minutes. 
3.2. Measures 
First, the 67 items of the four scales of interest (NT1, MD1, MD2, HIT) were screened and 
preselected for the goals of the study. The items retained for Study 1 are shown in Table 2. 
Ten items of the MD1 scale were eliminated: As suggested by Pelton and colleagues (2004), 
the four euphemistic language items were removed because they are inappropriate for 
children. The other items were removed either because they related to behavioral domains 
other than violence and aggression or because they turned out to (almost) duplicate items in 
other scales.8 Three items were removed from the MD2 scale because of inverse wording or 
translation problems.  
The HIT scale used for the present study is a Dutch adaptation of the original scale that 
focuses on aggression and verbal bullying (van der Velden 2008). From this 28-item scale we 
discarded items related to primary self-serving cognitive distortions and social desirability as 
well as five filler items. Two items in the blaming others subscale were removed because they 
were designed to capture hostile attribution of intent (Crick and Dodge 1994).9 Three other 
items were removed because they strongly overlapped with items from other scales or 
because of translation problems. Finally, one item in the NT1 scale was deleted because it 
overlapped with another. 
                                                 
8 This implies that the correlations between the scales reported below would likely have been stronger if 
overlapping items had been retained. Hence, the coefficients presented in the following can be viewed as 
conservative estimates of the correlations that would have resulted between the full-length original scales. 
9 E.g., “People are always trying to start fights with me.” Some authors even explicitly use these items as 
indicators of hostile attribution bias (Pornari and Woods 2010). 
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The 31 items retained from preselection were translated into German (see Table 2 for the 
English wordings) and used in a paper-and-pencil questionnaire in the Study 1 sample. 
 
3.3. Analysis 
Correlational and exploratory factor analyses (EFA) were used.10 First, all items of a given 
scale were forced to load on one single factor (Table 2, column 7). To improve the 
measurement quality of the scale, items with standardized loadings above .4 were selected 
and their standardized scores were averaged.11 Then the four scales were correlated with each 
other and factor analyzed to test the empirical overlap (Table 3). Finally, all preselected 
indicators of the four scales were forced to load on a single factor (Table 2, column 8). 
Basically, all items with a loading above .4 were selected for the final integrated moral 
neutralization scale used in Study 2. 
To prevent case deletions in the factor analyses and in the computation of the sum scores all 
missing values in the items were imputed using the EM imputation algorithm (SPSS 2009). 
The number of missing cases varied between 0 and 14 per indicator (Table 2). 
3.4. Results 
First, we examine the properties of each individual scale. The first factor extracted from the 
ten MD1 items accounts for 21.2 percent of total variance (eigenvalue 2.12). With 
eigenvalues of 1.54, and 1.17 respectively, the next two factors also account for a substantial 
                                                 
10 Although confirmatory factor analyses would have been the method of choice, preliminary tests suggested that 
both the overall sample size and the ratio of the number of parameter estimates to the number of cases were too 
small to allow proper parameter estimation (see e.g., Bentler and Chou 1987; Hair et al. 2006; Jackson 2003).  
11 The criterion of .4 is somewhat stricter than the one of .3 typically recommended (Bryant and Yarnold 1995), 
to reduce the number of items for the final scale. 
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share of the total variance. However, the loading structure in the three-factor solution (not 
shown) does not suggest any meaningful factor. Since all items in the one-factor solution load 
positively and significantly on the single factor, the hypothesis of one-dimensionality is 
supported by the data. However, only four items meet the strict criterion of a loading above .4 
(Table 2, Item ID 1–4) and were kept for scale construction. The resulting scale yields an 
internal consistency of Cronbach’s α=.61 (Table 3). 
Factor analysis of the ten MD2 items shows a clearer scree pattern (Cattell and Vogelmann 
1977). The first factor accounts for 32.1 percent of the variance, the corresponding eigenvalue 
of 3.21 being much higher than the eigenvalue of the next two factors (1.18, 1.04). Moreover, 
all items of the scale load with at least .4 on the single-factor solution, thus clearly suggesting 
monodimensionality. The resulting scale yields a Cronbach’s α of .76. Similarly, the first 
factor extracted from the HIT items accounts for 32.7 percent of total variance, and the 
corresponding eigenvalue of 2.62 is again much higher than the eigenvalue of the next two 
factors (1.12, 1.02), again evidencing a clear scree pattern. All items of this scale also load 
positively on the single-factor solution. One item had a loading below .4 (ID 28) and was 
consequently excluded. The derived 7-item scale yields a reliability of .71. Finally, the first 
factor extracted from the three NT1 items explains 51.4 percent of the variance (eigenvalue 
1.54) while the other two factors have eigenvalues below 1 (0.85, 0.61). All three items load 
with at least .6 on the first factor. The derived scale yields a Cronbach’s α of .52.
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Table 2: Item wordings, descriptive statistics, and factor loadings in Study 1 
Item wording 
Generic 
domain Scale N M S.D. 
Single-factor 
loading on 
original scale 
Single-factor loading 
of selected items on 
total scale 
Item 
ID  
It is alright to fight to protect your friends. Cog. Restruct. MD1 138 2.51 1.03 .742 .578 1 
It is alright to fight when your group's honour is threatened. Cog. Restruct. MD1 128 1.75 0.91 .724 .630 2 
If someone acts like a jerk, it is ok to treat them badly. Victim MD1 141 1.52 0.75 .663 .612 3 
It is unfair to blame a child who had only a small part in the harm caused by a group. Minim. Agency MD1 136 2.93 1.29 .410 .137 4 
A kid who only suggests breaking rules should not be blamed if other kids go ahead and do it. Minim. Agency MD1 137 1.88 1.03 .350 --  5 
If a group decides together to do something harmful it is unfair to blame any kid in the group for it. Minim. Agency MD1 140 3.07 1.28 .332 --  6 
Insults among children do not hurt anyone. Neg. Impact MD1 137 1.55 0.85 .254 --  7 
Teasing someone does not really hurt them. Neg. Impact MD1 137 1.54 0.87 .234 --  8 
A kid in a gang should not be blamed for the trouble the gang causes. Minim. Agency MD1 135 2.84 1.14 .230 --  9 
Children do not mind being teased because it shows interest in them Neg. Impact MD1 135 1.54 0.84 .170 --  10 
Bullying can be a good way to solve problems. Neg. Impact MD2 142 1.34 0.68 .702 .574 11 
It’s okay to join in when someone you don’t like is being bullied. Cog. Restruct. MD2 138 1.51 0.78 .656 .599 12 
Sometimes it’s okay to bully other people. Cog. Restruct. MD2 141 1.74 0.88 .649 .622 13 
Some kids get bullied because they deserve it. Victim MD2 136 1.92 1.02 .634 .570 14 
Bullying is just a normal part of being a kid. Cog. Restruct. MD2 137 1.89 0.86 .556 .471 15 
Some kids need to be picked on just to teach them a lesson. Neg. Impact MD2 139 1.65 0.83 .550 .564 16 
In my group of friends, bullying is okay. Cog. Restruct. MD2 140 1.34 0.59 .483 .471 17 
It’s okay to pick on losers. Victim MD2 142 1.18 0.53 .482 .294 18 
Most students who get bullied bring it on themselves.  Victim MD2 138 2.02 0.86 .475 .458 19 
Getting bullied helps to make people tougher. Neg. Impact MD2 140 1.81 1.05 .402 .427 20 
You should hurt people first, before they hurt you. Assuming Worst HIT 138 1.58 0.93 .720 .686 21 
People sometimes need to be bashed. Cog. Restruct. HIT 139 1.65 0.93 .706 .663 22 
Sometimes you have to hurt people if you have a problem with them. Minim. Agency HIT 141 1.73 0.82 .667 .605 23 
Only a coward would ever walk away from a fight. Cog. Restruct. HIT 139 1.91 1.08 .662 .592 24 
It's ok to slag other people off, they slag you off too. Assuming Worst HIT 141 1.72 0.87 .574 .568 25 
It's ok to slag other people off. It doesn't really hurt anybody. Cog. Restruct. HIT 142 1.38 0.72 .464 .388 26 
If people don't cooperate with me, it's not my fault if someone gets hurt. Minim. Agency HIT 131 2.05 1.17 .404 .381 27 
If you don't push people around, you will always get picked on. Assuming Worst HIT 136 1.71 0.84 .111 --  28 
It's ok to get in a physical fight with someone if you have to stand up to protect your rights. Cog. Restruct. NT 137 1.82 0.94 .803 .668 29 
It's ok to get in a physical fight with someone if they hit you first. Minim. Agency NT 137 2.08 1.04 .711 .508 30 
It's ok to hurt someone if you didn't mean to or it was an accident. Minim. Agency NT 139 2.12 1.01 .627 .418 31 
Note: Standardised factor loadings below .4 are shaded in grey. Item IDs of items omitted from the final scale are also shaded in grey. 
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Table 3: Correlations between different scales of moral neutralization (Study 1) 
  Correlations         
  1 2 3 Factor loading M S.D. Alpha 
1 MD1    .79 0.00 0.68 .61 
2 MD2 .51   .84 0.00 0.56 .76 
3 HIT .56 .77  .90 0.00 0.60 .71 
4 NT1 .59 .53 .64 .82 0.00 0.72 .52 
 
 
As Table 3 shows, the four mean scales derived from the MD1, MD2, HIT, and NT scales are 
strongly correlated with each other (.51***≤r≤.77***). Accordingly, factorial analysis of 
these mean scales suggests a one-factor solution, the first factor explaining 70.1 percent of the 
variance (eigenvalue 2.8) while the other three factors have eigenvalues below 0.6. Similarly, 
when all items constituting the four moral neutralization scales are factor-analyzed together 
(Table 2), a clear scree pattern emerges suggesting a one-dimensional factor structure. The 
first factor accounts for 23.2 percent of total variance (eigenvalue 7.19) while all other factors 
have eigenvalues of 2.0 and below. All items load significantly on the first factor. Overall, 
these results strongly support the hypothesis that neutralization techniques, moral 
disengagement, and secondary self-serving cognitive distortions converge not only 
theoretically but also empirically. 
For the final version of the instrument the number of items was reduced yet again,12 and the 
item wordings were refined, unified, and simplified to better meet the needs of the study 
population. The resulting 18-item moral neutralization instrument was tested in a second 
                                                 
12 Four items with loadings below .4 on the total scale were removed (ID 4, 18, 26, 27). One item was deleted 
because of its difficult (German) wording (ID 23) and another because it could potentially reflect facts rather 
than rationalizations (ID 17). 
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pretest sample of 118 fourth- and fifth-graders (mean age M=11.4 (SD=0.48); 50.0 percent 
male). As a result of this analysis, one item with a loading below .4 was removed from the 
scale (ID 31). After this, only one item reflecting agency minimization remained in the scale 
(ID 30). This item was also omitted to further shorten and simplify the scale. The final 16-
item version of the scale yields an excellent consistency of α=.87 (first pretest sample) and 
α=.88 (second pretest sample). 
4. Study 2: Testing the Composite Scale 
Study 2 assessed the internal consistency, cross-gender structural invariance, and criterion 
validity of the moral neutralization scale developed in Study 1 in a large sample of 
preadolescents and also includes correlational analyses with two constructs relevant to 
Situational Action Theory (Wikström and Treiber 2009) to explore possible integration of the 
moral neutralization concept within this broader criminological framework. 
4.1. Participants and Data Collection 
Data for this study were collected as part of z-proso, a large-scale prospective longitudinal 
study (Eisner and Ribeaud 2005). Participants were recruited from a stratified random sample 
of 56 public primary schools in the city of Zurich when they entered grade 1 in 2004. Initial 
recruitment involved letters to the parents in their native language (nine languages) followed 
by telephone appointments for personal interviews, again in the parents’ native language. 
Parental consent for the child’s participation was obtained at the beginning of the parent 
interview at the parent’s home, as a part of the informed consent procedure (for details on 
sampling and recruitment see Eisner et al. 2009; Eisner and Ribeaud 2005; Eisner and 
Ribeaud 2007).13 At the time of the fourth data collection wave used for the present study, a 
valid set of moral neutralization data was available for 1,109 participants. This corresponds to 
                                                 
13 Parental consent for child participation was also obtained for an additional 8.6 percent of the raw sample from 
parents who refused to participate themselves. Overall, the child participation rate at wave 1 was 82.6 percent. 
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a participation rate of 66.2 percent of the gross sample and a retention rate of 81.5 percent of 
the wave 1 sample.14 At wave 4, participants were aged M=11.33 on average (SD=0.37), 50.9 
percent were male, 44.4 percent were from migrant families (both parents born abroad). Of 
the participants 87.5 percent were in fifth grade, 10.3 percent in fourth grade, and 2.2 percent 
in another grade, in special education without specified grade, or respective data were 
missing. Overall, 3.1 percent of the children attended a special education class.  
The surveys were conducted during regular school hours in classrooms of public schools. 
Participants at a given school were pooled across classes to form groups of 5 to 20 children. 
Participating children were guided through the written questionnaire by two or three 
researchers. The surveys lasted 90 minutes. The 13.8 percent of the children who had moved 
out of the city or who were the only project participant in their school were surveyed 
individually at their home. 
Selected behavioral outcomes were also measured at the parent and teacher levels. Among the 
1,109 cases with a valid moral neutralization measure, there were 994 cases with a completed 
parent questionnaire and 1,009 with a completed teacher questionnaire. Parents, usually the 
mothers, were surveyed at home with standardized computer-assisted face-to-face interviews 
which lasted about an hour. Participants were offered an incentive worth approximately €25 
per interview. Since 57 percent of the parents in the gross sample belonged to migrant 
communities, interviews were also conducted in the most important minority languages 
(Albanian, English, Italian, Portuguese, Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian, Spanish, Tamil, and 
Turkish). Details of the multilingual survey procedure are described in Eisner and Ribeaud 
(2007). Teacher assessments consisted of one-page paper-and-pencil questionnaires that 
                                                 
14 The considerable drop in participation between wave 1 and 4 is a consequence of the legal necessity to renew 
parental consent for all participants at wave 4. At this time, many parents refused continuing involvement of 
their children in the study. 
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included questions on the child’s child behavior, on the child’s social role in the class, and 
academic achievement. 
 
4.2. Measures 
Moral neutralization was measured with the 16-item scale developed in Study 1. Eight items 
refer to mechanisms involving cognitive restructuring, three are related to 
distortion/disregard of negative consequences, three relate to blaming the victim, and two 
involve assuming the worst. As to behavioral domains, eight items relate to bullying and 
verbal aggression, five relate to physical aggression, and two relate to aggression in general.  
Only questionnaires with a valid entry for at least 10 of the 16 items were retained for further 
analysis. The 59 cases with one to six missing values were imputed using the EM algorithm 
(SPSS 2009). Scale properties are presented in the results section. 
A first set of behavioral outcomes used to assess the criterion validity of the moral 
neutralization instruments was measured with the Social Behavior Questionnaire developed 
by Tremblay and colleagues (1991). The Social Behavior Questionnaire is similar to the 
Child Behavior Checklist (Achenbach and Ruffle 2000) and is adapted from the Preschool 
Behavior Questionnaire (Behar and Stringfield 1974) and the Prosocial Behavior 
Questionnaire (Weir and Duveen 1981). For the present study we used an age-adapted written 
version for the child survey while parents were administered the face-to-face adult version 
and teachers completed an abbreviated written version (for more details see Ribeaud and 
Eisner 2010). All versions are based on 5-point Likert scales. The prosociality subscale elicits 
altruistic and empathic behavior (child version (C): 8 items, Cronbach’s α=.79; parent version 
(P): 10 items, α=.83; teacher version (T): 7 items, α=.92). The Social Behavior Questionnaire 
also differentiates between two basic types of aggression, namely, indirect/covert aggression 
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(C: 3, α=.76; P: 5, α=.82; T: n.a.) and direct/overt aggression (C: 9, α=.76; P: 12, α=.82; T: 
11, α=.93). 
Further behavioral outcomes include a bullying scale covering four types of bullying (verbal, 
physical, exclusion, hiding/destroying property) measured at the child level (4, α=.75) and 
three indices of delinquency and serious problem behavior encompassing truancy, substance 
use (alcohol, tobacco, cannabis), theft, vandalism, carrying a weapon, and assault (C: 11, 
α=.67; P: 9, α=.37; T: 8, α=.48). 
Two indicators are related to social skills. To assess aggressive conflict resolution schemata 
participants were asked what they usually do in a conflict with other children. Answers were 
recorded on 5-point Likert scales (4 items, α=.70). Within the same instrument we also 
assessed socially competent conflict resolution schemata (4 items, α=.65).  
Finally, two indicators related to cognitive predispositions were included because of their 
specific relevance to Situational Action Theory (Wikström and Treiber 2009). Low self-
control was assessed using a scale derived from Grasmick and colleagues (1993), with two 
items for each of the five domains of risk-seeking, impulsivity, self-centeredness, preference 
for physical activities, and low frustration tolerance (10 items, α=.74). Intrinsic benefits and 
discounting of moral costs of offending were measured with a scenario-based instrument 
assessing decision-making . Participants were presented three scenarios depicting the 
following situations: reacting violently to a provocation, threatening a schoolmate to get his 
mobile phone, and shoplifting chewing gum. For each situation respondents answered 
questions about the perceived internal and external (i.e., social) costs and benefits. The 
intrinsic benefits of offending were assessed by asking how good the respondents would feel 
in the depicted situation, with high values corresponding to feeling very good. Discounting of 
moral costs was assessed by asking respondents how bad they would find it to act as depicted, 
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with low values indicating feeling very bad about offending. All responses were recorded on 
4-point Likert scales (6 items, α=.73). 
4.3. Analysis 
The internal consistency of the moral neutralization measure developed in Study 1 was 
assessed with confirmatory factor analysis and the invariance of the factor structure tested 
across gender groups with AMOS 6.0 software (Arbuckle, 2005). Then convergent and 
divergent validity of the derived moral neutralization scale was assessed using Pearson 
correlations with selected behavioral and cognitive constructs. 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Internal Consistency 
The moral neutralization construct’s internal consistency was assessed in a one-factor 
structure in which all 16 items of the scale were forced to load on a single factor. This initial 
solution yields a near-acceptable fit of CFI=.926, RMSEA=.055 (χ2=452.1; df=104; N=1109; 
p<.001). Modification indices suggested that freeing-up four covariances among error terms 
could significantly improve model fit (χ2=194.0; df=6).15 This increases the fit indices of the 
adapted model to CFI=.966, RMSEA=.038.  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics and standardized loadings on the Moral Neutralization factor (N=1209) 
     Standardized 
factor loadings 
Itema Item wordingb Domain M S.D. All 
Boy
s 
Girls 
1 It is alright to fight to protect your friends. Cog. Restruct. 2.23 0.99 .48 .44 .53 
2 
It is alright to beat somebody who doesn’t respect your 
friends. 
Cog. Restruct. 1.40 0.68 
.69 .71 .57 
12 
It’s okay to join in when someone you don’t like is being 
bullied. 
Cog. Restruct. 1.47 0.71 
.56 .57 .49 
13 Sometimes it’s okay to bully other people. Cog. Restruct. 1.56 0.75 .61 .63 .61 
15 Bullying is just a normal part of being a kid. Cog. Restruct. 1.91 0.92 .45 .45 .46 
                                                 
15 The six covariances relate to items with identical keywords and/or similar meaning. 
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22 People sometimes need to be bashed. Cog. Restruct. 1.56 0.84 .65 .68 .50 
24 Only a coward would ever walk away from a fight. Cog. Restruct. 1.80 1.04 .51 .51 .42 
29 
It's ok to get in a physical fight with someone if you have 
to stand up to protect your rights 
Cog. Restruct. 1.67 0.85 
.60 .62 .47 
11 Many problems can be solved with violence. Neg. Impact 1.27 0.66 .46 .48 .31 
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Some kids need to be picked on just to teach them a 
lesson. 
Neg. Impact 1.50 0.77 
.68 .70 .63 
20 Getting bullied helps to make people tougher. Neg. Impact 1.77 0.89 .38 .39 .37 
3 If someone acts like a jerk, it is ok to treat them badly. Victim 1.50 0.69 .67 .69 .60 
14 Some kids get bullied because they deserve it. Victim 1.85 0.91 .58 .59 .54 
19 Most students who get bullied bring it on themselves. Victim 2.14 0.90 .38 .38 .35 
21 You should hurt people first, before they hurt you. Assum. Worst 1.51 0.81 .60 .62 .47 
25 It's ok to slag other people off, they slag you off too. Assum. Worst 1.79 0.90 .53 .53 .54 
a see Table 2; b wordings may slightly differ from those in Study 1 due to refinements. 
As shown in Table 4, the standardized loadings range between .38 and .67 in the full sample. 
Both the level of model fit and the loading structure confirm one-dimensionality. Overall, the 
16-item scale of moral neutralization (M=1.78, SD=0.49) used for further analysis yields a 
consistency coefficient of α=.87. Tests of structural invariance (Table 5) provide limited 
confirmation of invariance across genders. Although standardized factor loadings are within 
similar ranges for boys (.38 to .71, see Table 4) and girls (.31 to .63), constraining the factor 
loadings to equality across genders yields a highly significant decrease in model fit (χ2=119.5; 
df=16; see Table 5). The decrease is further exacerbated when error terms (χ2=320.0; df=32) 
and error covariances (χ2=345.0; df=38) are also constrained to equality. However, the less 
strict tests of model fit based on fit indices suggest that constraining factor loadings to 
equality is acceptable (CFI=.942; RMSEA=.033; see Table 5), while imposing further 
restrictions (equal error terms, equal error covariances) results in poor CFI values. 
Table 5: Tests of factorial invariance across gender groups 
Model CFI RMSEA χ2 df  χ2/df Diff. in χ2  Diff. in DF p 
Unconstrained across groups .966 .026 343.4 196 1.75     
Equal (unstandardised) loadings .942 .033 462.9 212 2.18 119.5 16 <.001 
Equal loadings and equal error 
terms .900 .041 663.4 228 2.91 320.0 32 <.001 
Equal loadings, equal error terms 
and equal error covariances .896 .042 688.4 234 2.94 345.0 38 <.001 
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4.4.2. Criterion Validity 
Table 6 displays the correlations between the moral neutralization scale and selected 
constructs for the entire sample and for both genders separately. The first row shows a marked 
correlation with gender (r=-.25***16), moral neutralization being more prevalent among boys 
than among girls. With one exception, all correlations with behavioral outcomes are highly 
significantly correlated in the expected direction in the entire sample. While prosociality is 
consistently and significantly negatively correlated with moral neutralization across 
informants (child measure (C): r=-.27***; parent (P): r=-.10***; teacher (T): r=-.15***), both 
direct (C: r=.59***; P: r=.10**; T: r=.27***) and indirect aggression (C: r=.46***; P: r=.04ns; 
T: n.a.) are significantly positively associated with moral neutralization (except parent-
reported indirect aggression). Moreover, self-reported bullying (r=.42***) and delinquency 
and problem behavior as reported by all three informant groups are also highly significantly 
correlated with moral neutralization (C: r=.31***; P: r=.11**; T: r=.21***). The children’s 
behavioral self-ratings correlate much better with (self-rated) moral neutralization than the 
teachers’ and the parents’ ratings. The scale’s specific focus on aggressive outcomes is 
reflected in stronger correlations with the aggression and bullying scales compared—for a 
specific type of informant—to general delinquency/problem behavior.  
These results corroborate the predictive validity of the moral neutralization scales in the 
domain of aggressive and, more generally, antisocial behavior, the latter as a consequence of 
the strong association between aggressive outcomes and other forms of deviance (not shown). 
Construct validity is also corroborated by the positive correlations of moral neutralization 
with aggressive conflict resolution schemata (r=.55***) and by the less pronounced negative 
                                                 
16 ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; nsp>.05 
24 
correlation with competent conflict resolution schemata (r=-.22***). Finally, low self-control 
is strongly correlated with moral neutralization (r=.51***). Also, a favorable perception of the 
costs and benefits of offending is similarly highly correlated with moral neutralization 
(r=.48***) which likely reflects that moral neutralization affects the cost-benefit assessment 
of offending. 
Gender-specific results show that the correlations found for the entire sample can, by and 
large, be reproduced in both genders, so it would not appear that moral neutralization 
mediates gender-effects. These results also suggest that moral neutralization is similarly 
correlated with behavioral and cognitive outcomes in girls and in boys, providing further 
corroboration of the construct validity of the moral neutralization scale. 
Table 6: Correlations of moral neutralization with selected constructs 
  All Boys Girls 
Gender (1=male; 2=female) -.248*** -- -- 
Prosociality (child) -.269*** -.243*** -.156*** 
Prosociality (parent) -.100*** -.106* .029 
Prosociality (teacher) -.149*** -.135** -.005 
Direct/overt aggression (child) .585*** .603*** .465*** 
Direct/overt aggression (parent) .097** .075 .049 
Direct/overt aggression (teacher) .268*** .264*** .162*** 
Indirect/covert aggression (child) .457*** .459*** .411*** 
Indirect/covert aggression (parent) .038 .088* .029 
Bullying (child) .417*** .382*** .380*** 
Delinquency and problem behavior (child) .314*** .290*** .239*** 
Delinquency and problem behavior (parent) .108*** .105* .022 
Delinquency and problem behavior (Teacher) .209*** .190*** .175*** 
Aggressive conflict resolution strategies (child) -.550*** -.557*** -.440*** 
Competent conflict resolution strategies (child) -.223*** -.221*** -.187*** 
Low Self-control (child) .514*** .524*** .453*** 
Intrinsic benefits and discounting of moral costs (child) .475*** .475*** .357*** 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05 994≤N≤1109 505≤n≤564 483≤n≤545 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
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Our research confirms that the three concepts of Neutralization Techniques (Sykes and Matza 
1957), Moral Disengagement (Bandura et al. 1996), and secondary Self-Serving Cognitive 
Distortions (Barriga and Gibbs 1996) essentially capture the same cognitive processes. A 
conceptual review broadly supports the convergence hypothesis by demonstrating that the 
three approaches identify (under different labels) cognitive restructuration, minimizing own 
agency, disregarding/distorting negative impact, and blaming/dehumanizing the victim as the 
four key mechanisms forming a cluster of cognitive processes serving to cognitively 
overcome dissonance between individual moral standards and behavioral transgressions.17 
This set of processes, labeled moral neutralization in the present study, is important for 
individuals to maintain their moral self-concept without experiencing moral self-sanctions, 
and thus allowing transgressions of moral norms at reduced psychological costs. Importantly, 
all three approaches identify these processes as preceding specific antisocial actions and thus 
conceive moral neutralization as facilitating such actions. So all three approaches conceive 
moral neutralization as a factor in the (proximal) causation of antisocial action.  
Factor analyses of 31 items derived from a selection of moral neutralization measures tested 
in a small-scale study (Study 1) corroborate empirical convergence of the different 
formulations of moral neutralization and confirm the finding from previous research (e.g., 
Bandura et al. 1996) that the key mechanisms of moral neutralization tend to appear together 
in the same persons. 
The 16-item scale of moral neutralization focusing on neutralization of aggression and 
bullying constructed in Study 1 was found to be internally consistent, invariant across genders 
and valid when tested in a large sample of 11-year olds (Study 2). Confirming previous 
research we found a higher prevalence of moral neutralization among boys (Bandura et al. 
                                                 
17 The self-serving cognitive distortions approach additionally identifies the mechanism of assuming the worst 
which is partly related to attribution of blame but is more general in assuming negative outcomes as legitimation 
for the transgression of moral rules. 
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1996; van der Velden 2008) and marked positive correlations with aggressive, violent, and 
delinquent behavior (Agnew 1994; Bandura 1996; Barriga and Gibbs 1996; Hymel et al. 
2005; Nas et al. 2008; Pelton et al. 2004). Conversely, moral neutralization was confirmed to 
be negatively correlated with prosocial behavior (Bandura et al. 1996). These correlations 
remained fairly stable across genders, suggesting that the scale has the same predictive power 
in both gender groups. Concerning the sources of information about behavioral outcomes, the 
children’s self-ratings were much better correlated with (self-assessed) moral neutralization 
than the teachers’ and parents’ ratings. This finding is in line with validation studies of moral 
disengagement which also find higher correlations for the children’s self-assessments 
(Bandura et al. 1996, 369; Pelton et al. 2004, 36). The scale’s criterion validity was further 
corroborated by its marked correlation with conflict resolution strategies, which is also found 
for each gender separately and which confirms earlier findings on a linkage between moral 
disengagement and social competence (Pelton et al. 2004, 36). 
 
5.1. Theoretical Outlook 
Our conceptual and empirical analyses suggest that moral disengagement, neutralization 
techniques, and (secondary) self-serving cognitive distortions describe the very same 
cognitive processes and that these processes tend to cluster within the same persons. For the 
sake of scientific parsimony it seems justified to subsume these processes under the single 
label of moral neutralization and to derive a single scale informed by all the original 
conceptualizations.  
From this unifying point, theoretical criminology needs to integrate the concept into a broader 
theoretical frame. As suggested by Maruna and Copes (2005) it makes little sense to construct 
an etiology of deviance or aggression on the sole basis of neutralization techniques (or, 
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correspondingly, moral neutralization).18 Because of its understanding of crime and violence 
as moral action and its focus on the most proximal mechanisms of crime/violence causation, 
Situational Action Theory (Wikström 2004; Wikström and Treiber 2009) offers a promising 
framework to integrate the concept of moral neutralization. Wikström and Treiber posit that 
acts of crime and violence are the product of an interaction between situational characteristics 
(temptations, provocations, moral context19) and individual decision making, viewing 
individual decision-making as largely determined by an individual’s morality and ability to 
exercise self-control. In a given situation of temptation or provocation with a given moral 
context, acts of violence are expected when an individual has not internalized the moral rules 
relevant in the corresponding situation so that acting violently is viewed as a legitimate option 
or when an individual is unable to exercise self-control when confronted with temptation or 
provocation and hence unable to act in accordance with his or her moral beliefs. 
Within this framework the concept of moral neutralization is useful for understanding another 
mechanism that facilitates violent or, more generally, immoral action. Specifically, we posit 
that an individual able to cognitively neutralize the incongruence between his or her moral 
beliefs and acts that conflict with those beliefs is also more likely to engage in immoral 
action. In other words, moral neutralization allows internalized moral rules to be temporarily 
discarded and makes them appear irrelevant in specific situations.20 It is expected that such a 
                                                 
18 Maruna and Copes (2005) suggest a theoretical integration that differs substantially from what we propose. In 
essence, they conceive neutralization techniques/moral neutralization as post-transgression mechanisms that are 
important for understanding persistence of or desistance from criminal behavior. Although we agree on the 
relevance of such mechanisms, we believe that moral neutralization is also important in the immediate pre-
transgression phase. In line with Bandura, our starting point is that “people do not ordinarily engage in 
reprehensible conduct until they have justified to themselves the rightness of their actions” (Bandura et al. 1996, 
365). 
19 “A moral context is defined as the action-relevant moral rules that apply to a setting and their level of 
enforcement” (Wikström and Treiber 2009, 91). 
20 With regard to neutralization techniques, Agnew (1994, 567–568) supplies valuable evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. 
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mechanism will substantially lower the psychological costs of violence and thus also lower 
the individual pressure to exercise self-control. This view is also in line with the concept of 
Gibbs and colleagues (1995) that secondary self-serving cognitive distortions (or, more 
generally, moral neutralization) are “pre- or post-transgression rationalizations [that] reduce 
the stresses from the consequences of the primary distortions” (Barriga and Gibbs 1996, 334), 
where the notion of primary distortions shares much in common with Gottfredson and 
Hirschi’s concept of self-control (1990; see footnote 4).  
The strong correlations between moral neutralization and both self-control and favorable 
perception of the costs and benefits of offending supplies preliminary empirical support for 
this conception of the mechanisms linking self-control and moral neutralization in the 
causation of aggressive and otherwise antisocial behavior. However, further research is 
needed to conclusively elucidate the mechanisms connecting these three constructs in the 
immediate causation of violence and, more generally, immoral action. Further extensions of 
the theory should also encompass situational characteristics—or elements of the moral 
context—that are likely to trigger specific moral neutralizations (e.g., being with a group of 
friends is likely to trigger diffusion of responsibility). 
5.2. Need for Conceptual Clarification 
Our review of the different conceptualizations of moral neutralization shows that some 
authors fail to clearly differentiate between processes of moral neutralization and biased 
social information processing. In particular, we found that hostile attribution of intent (e.g. 
Crick and Dodge 1994) was identified as a mechanism of blaming the other (Bandura et al. 
1996) or of assuming the worst (Barriga and Gibbs 1996). Other authors have already stressed 
the fundamental difference between biased information processing and cognitive processes 
related to aggression beliefs and aggression legitimation (Zelli et al. 1999). For that reason we 
dropped items likely to measure biased social perception rather than self-serving legitimations 
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from our scale in the preselection procedure. Future research should better take into account 
such delimitation problems to increase the conceptual clarity and, consequently, the 
discriminant validity of corresponding measurements.21 
 
5.3. Limitations and Future Directions for Research 
The moral neutralization scale presented in this article suffers several limitations. First, unlike 
most other scales reviewed above, our moral neutralization scale focuses specifically on the 
neutralization of aggression and violence rather than on a broader range of antisocial and/or 
immoral behaviors, and its predictive scope is accordingly narrower than that of more general 
scales. Second, the findings are limited to a general population of preadolescents. Results 
from younger and older age groups and from high-risk populations are needed for a fuller 
assessment of the scale’s properties. Third, given the cross-sectional nature of our data, the 
direction of the relationship between moral neutralization, aggression, and other proximal 
factors involved in the causation and perpetuation of aggression is not clear. From a 
theoretical point of view experimental and longitudinal research aimed precisely at unraveling 
pre- and post-transgression mechanisms involving moral neutralization would be highly 
desirable.  
Finally, our review of different scales in the field of moral neutralization showed that they 
were validated with samples of very different ages, in a range between 10 and 20 years. 
However, in most studies the age of the participants and their level of moral development are 
not an issue. Hence, both theory and research would likely benefit to focus on the emergence 
                                                 
21 Similar conceptual blur is also likely in other domains such as the differentiation between lack of empathy and 
conscious denial of injury. 
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and consequent development of moral neutralization patterns in the life course22 and to link 
these patterns with other relevant developmental processes, such as moral development, the 
emergence and consolidation of self-control and, of course, with trajectories of aggression and 
violence. 
                                                 
22 To our knowledge, only one study specifically focuses on the developmental precursors of moral 
disengagement (Hyde, Shaw, and Moilanen 2010) while another analyzes trajectories of moral disengagement 
(Paciello et al. 2008). However, since it started measuring moral disengagement as late as age 14, the decisive 
stage of preadolescent development remains unexplored. 
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